Cutting aid, fuelling irregular migration? The possible unintended effects of global aid cuts

USAID via Flickr

In recent years, aid has increasingly been used as a tool to control migration, including by the EU. While its effectiveness remains debated, Anna Knoll and Tobias Heidland argue that new evidence, including insights from the DYNAMIG project, suggests that improving living conditions through aid can actually reduce migration aspirations. They warn that global aid cuts might backfire – driving illegal migration rather than curbing it.

Western countries are undergoing the greatest shift in their approach to official development assistance (ODA) since the start of the new millennium. Under President Trump, the United States is scaling back its efforts massively, effectively dismantling USAID, its agency for international development. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, too, has announced plans to reduce its overseas aid budget from 0.5% to 0.3% of gross national income to fund increased defense spending. But this shift extends far beyond these two nations. Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the EU have all announced bilateral aid cuts in 2024. These cuts are likely not just temporary – they are here to stay.

Beyond reduced budgets, foreign aid is becoming less altruistic and increasingly driven by self-interest. In a new multipolar era with heightened geopolitical competition and domestic pressure to prioritise national interests, countries are directing their resources more towards advancing their specific foreign policy goals. This shift has come at the expense of important long-term investments in development, such as strengthening the education systems of developing countries.

One example of this more interest-driven approach to aid is its use in curbing irregular migration.

Aid as a tool to control migration – but does it work?

One example of this more interest-driven approach to aid is its use in curbing irregular migration. Crossing borders – including irregular migration when legal pathways are absent – can be a crucial adaptation strategy for people facing severe circumstances. However, destination countries often have a strong preference for minimising ‘unwanted’ migration – irregular and forced migration – even at the risk of worsening conditions in countries of origin by obstructing migration as an adaptive mechanism.

The EU has long framed development cooperation as a tool to address the so-called root causes of irregular migration and displacement. A key pillar in these efforts is the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which directs resources towards improving economic opportunities, strengthening resilience and providing essential services such as healthcare and education – thus reducing the reasons to migrate irregularly – as well as enhancing migration management.

But there has been ongoing debate over whether development aid actually reduces irregular migration, with two main concerns at the forefront. First, improving people’s living standards and the opportunities available to them, or providing them with cash directly, may raise their aspirations and financial capacity, potentially increasing both their intentions and their ability to migrate. Second, the overall impact of ODA remains uncertain and effectiveness may be low, raising doubts about its efficacy in achieving desired migration-related outcomes.

However, recent empirical evidence – including from emerging DYNAMIG research on the effects of the EUTF for Africa on migration aspirations – suggests that aid can, in fact, help reduce people’s aspirations to move abroad. The evolving evidence base highlights three key areas where ODA can reduce migration and migration aspirations.

First, across different countries, researchers have found that improving basic services such as education, health and water is associated with lower migration aspirations; a pattern also reflected in our DYNAMIG study of the EUTF. Second, aid invested in improving local livelihoods has been linked to reduced migration aspirations. Finally, one of the most important drivers of migration is conflict, the risk of which can be reduced by ODA in post-conflict countries – if applied effectively.

If migration aspirations rise due to worsening economic conditions, deteriorating living conditions and greater instability, migration – both within regions and internationally to the EU and the US – may actually increase.

Why the aid cuts may backfire

Given these findings, current aid cuts could produce the opposite effect of what donor countries intend. If migration aspirations rise due to worsening economic conditions, deteriorating living conditions and greater instability, migration – both within regions and internationally to the EU and the US – may actually increase (a concern that other analysts have pointed out in the case of the US).

The rapid withdrawal of aid by the US is particularly destabilising. The impact is especially severe for essential health and basic service programmes in many countries, including in Africa. The cuts have left vulnerable populations facing greater food insecurity and health risks, undermining global efforts to promote stability and address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement.

In 2023, the top ten recipients of US aid included Ethiopia, Jordan, Egypt, Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo – countries central to the EU’s migration-related efforts, either as key origin countries or as hosts of large refugee populations. ​In countries like Jordan, cuts may affect social cohesion and stability, increasing the likelihood of secondary refugee movement.

The impact extends beyond social programmes; migration management programmes have also been affected. The International Organization for Migration, for instance, has had to lay off 3,000 staff working on resettlement programmes. Both governmental and non-governmental institutions that depend on aid are experiencing a loss of capacity, with some facing the risk of complete collapse.

These immediate effects – project shutdowns, the collapse of essential services and job losses – could trigger economic crises, political instability and even state fragility. In particular in heavily aid-dependent countries, this could lead to more irregular migration.

The EU’s recalibrated international cooperation strategy

As Western countries scale back their aid programmes – including those aimed at addressing the drivers of migration – the EU is recalibrating its own international cooperation strategy. Its Global Gateway initiative, launched in late 2021, signals a move away from traditional human development programmes and towards economic investments and infrastructure.

So far, Global Gateway activities are not directly targeting migration management, and it is still unclear to what extent they directly incorporate considerations for addressing migration-related drivers. In the short term, the extant and planned projects are unlikely to significantly reduce migration pressures, and it is unclear whether this new strategy can help address the drivers of irregular migration and displacement in the future.

Given the new geopolitical realities and rearmament dynamics, the EU and its member states face critical decisions regarding ODA in strategically important regions.

Given the new geopolitical realities and rearmament dynamics, the EU and its member states face critical decisions regarding ODA in strategically important regions. Balancing security priorities with sustained engagement and investment in basic infrastructure (such as education, healthcare and job creation) in key origin and transit areas will be a critical challenge. Short-term cost-cutting could undermine the ability to mitigate instabilities, with direct consequences for Europe. Engaging with partners through sustained development initiatives remains crucial to counter the influence of competing powers and address drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement.

The EU could also align its Global Gateway strategy more closely with migration realities. Finally, economic and geo-economic investments could better incorporate mechanisms that directly address migration drivers while ensuring that long-term development goals remain a core pillar of international cooperation.

Views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the REA can be held responsible for them.

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